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Abstract
With extensive country- and firm-level data sets we first document that the financial sectors 
of most sub-Saharan African countries remain significantly underdeveloped by the standards of 
other developing countries.  We also find that population density appears to be considerably more 
important for banking sector development in Africa than elsewhere.  To better understand how 
countries can overcome the high costs of developing viable banking sectors outside large 
metropolitan areas, we focus on Kenya, which has made significant strides in financial inclusion 
and development in recent years.  We find a positive and significant impact of Equity Bank, a 
leading private commercial bank on financial access, especially for under-privileged households.
Equity Bank’s business model—providing financial services to population segments typically 
ignored by traditional commercial banks and generating sustainable profits in the process—can be a 
potential solution to the financial access problem that has hindered the development of inclusive 
financial sectors in many other African countries. 
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2I. Introduction 
 Africa’s growth performance has long been disappointing and it has been described as a 
tragedy by some commentators (e.g., Easterly and Levine, 1997).  Although less well-documented 
and perhaps not surprising, the financial sectors of sub-Saharan African countries remain woefully 
under-developed, even relative to the standards of developing countries.  This is despite the fact that 
most of these countries have undergone extensive financial sector reforms in the last two decades of 
the same proportions as other developing and emerging countries.1
The financial development gap in sub-Saharan Africa is stark, and the gap is visible in the 
data.  For example, the population-weighted trends for developing regions in terms of liquid 
liabilities and private credit (both divided by GDP) show that the rest of the developing world has 
seen substantial improvement relative to Africa in the last two decades, though the patterns differ 
across regions.  Based on the pre-crisis data, the liquid liabilities of African financial sectors 
averaged below 30 percent of GDP in 2007 (see Table 1). In no other region of the developing 
world did that figure stand below 40 percent.  The credit side of the picture looked even worse: 
private credit averaged 17 percent of GDP in Africa in 2007, compared with ratios ranging from 33 
to 44 percent for other developing regions. These pre-crisis data show that the financial 
development indicators of Africa improved in the period 1995-2005, but at a much slower pace than 
in other developing and emerging countries in Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the Middle 
East.
The poor state of African financial development raises a number of important questions as to 
what went wrong with the financial reforms in Africa and what could be improved.  Is African 
financial development slow in itself, or is it a reflection of broader economic and policy failures?  
1 The reform packages included price and interest rate liberalization, removal of credit ceilings, introduction of a variety 
of measures for banking and capital market development, including financial regulatory schemes, and large scale 
privatizations of state-owned enterprises (see, for instance, Nissanke and Aryeetey, 1998; Senbet and Otchere, 2006; 
and Honohan and Beck, 2007).   
3Are the levels of financial development achieved in the developing world outside of Africa 
achievable for most African countries?  What factors have inhibited African financial development 
to this point and how can they be overcome?  Understanding these issues is of crucial importance 
given the ample empirical evidence of a linkage between financial development and economic 
development.2  Moreover, in the context of Africa where poverty is so widespread, the positive 
finance-growth nexus is suggestive of a positive linkage between finance and poverty alleviation.3
 There is very little rigorous academic research that addresses these questions.  This paper 
represents a first step in addressing key issues at the heart of African financial development.  We 
have three goals.  First, we assess whether African financial development is slower than it ought to 
be, using other developing countries as a benchmark.  Second, we identify factors that have more 
pronounced impact on financial development in Africa than in other developing countries, using 
both country- and firm-level data sets.  The problem for banks, that try to increase financial 
inclusion, is whether they can generate sufficient profits to sustain their business model.  In this 
regard, our third goal is to study Kenya, a country that has made significant strides in financial 
development in recent years, and Equity Bank, a leading private commercial bank devoted to 
providing banking services to lower income people.  We examine the impact of Equity Bank, along 
with other commercial banks, on financial access at the household level in Kenya.
To calibrate the financial development ‘gap’ between Africa and other developing countries, 
we first analyze the determinants of financial development in other developing countries (low- and 
middle-income countries) via regression models based on prior research.4  We use the regression 
coefficients to generate predicted levels of financial development, as measured by the ratios of 
2  See, for example, Levine (2005), Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000), and Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
3  Recent cross-country studies also find links between financial development and (lower) incidence of poverty (Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 2007; Clarke, Xu, and Zou, 2006). 
4 Our main financial development variables cover the period 1995-2007. The negative impact of the 2007-2009 global 
financial crisis has been less severe in Africa than in other regions, in part because the financial sectors were more 
isolated from global markets. See, for instance, Kamil and Rai (2010) for more details. 
4liquid liabilities and private credit over GDP, for sub-Saharan African countries (excluding South 
Africa).  Then we compare those predicted levels with the actual levels of financial development in 
the African countries.  We find that most African countries tend to have lower levels of financial 
development than would be predicted based on their fundamentals.  The average country falls 13 
percentage points short of its predicted level for liquid liabilities over GDP and 12 percentage points 
for private credit over GDP. 
To identify common and unique factors associated with financial development (or lack of) in 
Africa, we run regressions for other developing countries and African countries separately; we also 
examine the combined sample with an African dummy, and interact the African dummy with 
factors affecting financial sector development.  One of our main findings is that population density 
appears to be more important for banking sector development as measured by liquid liabilities and 
private credit (relative to GDP) in Africa than in other developing countries. If frequent interactions 
among firms, households, and investors are a necessary condition for business transactions, and 
hence financial development, then our results are plausible in that many African countries are 
endowed with scattered population and roads.  Furthermore, we find a nonlinear relationship 
between population density and banking sector development, and the largest gap between Africa 
and the rest of the developing world is for those African countries ‘trapped’ in low density areas.
We further explore the channels through which population density may affect banking sector 
development by examining additional variables related to population density.  We find that the 
percentage of population living in the largest cities, roads per square kilometer and bank branch 
penetration are all associated with a higher level of liquid liabilities relative to GDP, but the results 
are weaker for the level of private (bank) credit.  These results imply that the minimum viable 
banking sector scale is best achieved in major cities, and that technological advances, such as 
mobile telephone banking, could be one way to facilitate African financial development, especially 
5on the savings side of the banking sector outside metropolitan areas.5
Concerning other factors explaining banking sector development, we find that 
macroeconomic stability and broad measures of institutional quality are less important in Africa 
than in other developing countries, while the natural resource ‘curse’ (as in, e.g., Sachs and Warner, 
1995, 2001) is no worse in Africa than elsewhere. Finally, regarding indicators of stock market 
development, such as market capitalization and turnover, we do not find any of the factors 
associated with stock market development in the rest of the world to be significant in Africa.  In 
large part, this is because most African stock markets remain thin, illiquid and dysfunctional; and 
only very recently have Sub-Saharan African countries made a policy commitment to their 
development.   
We also conduct firm-level analyses which enable us to control for both country-level 
variables and firm characteristics in the same regressions.  Employing the widely used World Bank 
global Investment Climate Surveys (ICS), which are comprised primarily of firms that are not listed 
on stock markets, we examine factors determining firms’ access to external finance in the form of 
bank loans (from both domestic and foreign banks) and/or credit cards.6  The idea is that if a 
country’s banking sector is more developed, firms, and in particular privately owned firms, should 
have easier access to these types of formal finance.  We run regression models where we include the 
same country-level factors as in our cross-country studies as well as firm characteristics that could 
explain substantial variations in the demand for and in the use of financial services.  Once again, we 
include the African dummy and interact it with both country-level and firm-level variables.
The results of the micro-level regressions confirm that population density is an important 
5 Mbiti and Weil (2010) use the same household surveys in Kenya as in our paper, and find that increased use of M-
Pesa, one of the leading mobile phone based money transfer systems, lowers the propensity of people to use informal 
savings mechanisms but raises the probability of their use of banking services. 
6 This is consistent with prior research showing that financial institutions provide the most important source of external 
finance in most developing countries (e.g., Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2000).
6factor for access of firms to financial institutions.  While bank branch penetration is an important 
factor for access to bank finance, the coverage of roads is not as important for African firms as their 
counterparts elsewhere.  As with country-level studies, general infrastructural failures are not 
necessarily responsible for low levels of firm access to bank finance in Africa, but rather failures are 
specific to the banking sector and markets for loans.  While manufacturers are more likely to access 
bank finance in other countries, they show no strong tendency to rely on external finance relative to 
other firms in Africa. 
Having established population density as a key factor for financial development in Africa 
based on both cross-country and firm-level data, we next conduct a within-country study on Kenya.
There are several reasons for this choice.  First, based on our cross-country analysis, Kenya’s level 
of financial development is not too far off from the predicted level, and it has witnessed a strong 
bank branch expansion in recent years.  This expansion has also coincided with the emergence of 
Equity Bank, a pioneering (for-profit) commercial bank that devised a banking service strategy 
targeting low income clients and traditionally under-served territories.  The bank is listed on the 
Nairobi Stock Exchange, and has no government ownership share.  Many scholars and policy 
makers agree that a key obstacle to financial development is access of the disadvantaged to finance, 
which would promote economic growth at the broadest scales.  While the success of microfinance 
institutions (MFIs), such as Grameen Bank, has captured the attention of economists and policy 
makers, many MFIs currently are beset by non-repayment problems while most established 
commercial banks view the sectors targeted by MFIs as ‘unbankable.’  This makes Equity Bank and 
Kenya a particularly interesting ‘laboratory’ for the study of financial access.  Since institutional 
and macroeconomic conditions tend to be more homogeneous within a single country, the findings 
from our within-country study can reinforce the results from our cross-country study.  
The absence of micro-level data at both the household and bank branch level has made the 
7study of financial inclusion a challenge.  Fortunately, we are able to overcome that challenge using 
a new dataset on bank branch penetration at the district-level described in Allen et al. (2011), 
matched with household surveys of financial usage for Kenya that were conducted in 2006 and 
2009.  We find that Equity Bank presence is strongly associated with increases in households’ usage 
of bank accounts and bank credit between the two surveys.  These effects are particularly strong for 
under privileged households—those with low income and less education, who do not own a 
permanent house, and those that lack any member with a salaried job.   
We also find differences in branching strategies between Equity Bank and other commercial 
banks.  While all bank types (including Equity Bank) open a greater number of branches in urban, 
highly populated and English speaking districts, Equity Bank was more likely to expand to 
underdeveloped districts than other types of banks between 2006 and 2009— less densely populated 
areas and areas where the dominant language was not English or Swahili.  This different branching 
strategy is consistent with  our earlier result that population density is a major obstacle for financial 
sector development in Africa; more importantly, our results are encouraging in the sense that private 
institutions can arise in such an environment to help overcome the ‘no finance, no growth trap’ in 
many African countries. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes the data, methodology for 
benchmarking financial development across countries, and results on examining whether the actual 
financial sector development in Africa is below what the fundamentals would predict using other 
developing countries as benchmarks.  Then Section III examines whether the variables associated 
with banking development in other developing countries from our base models are related in a 
similar way to African banking development.  Section IV presents results on the determinants of 
firm access to external finance in Africa and other developing countries.  Section V presents results 
on financial access in Kenya and on the effect of bank branch expansion, particularly Equity Bank 
8branching strategy on the use of bank accounts and credit.  Section VI offers concluding remarks. 
II. Benchmarking Financial Development 
For cross-country comparison of financial development, the literature has turned 
increasingly to regression analysis to examine the level and variation of financial development 
across countries relying on some of the same variables that have been used to study the links 
between financial development and growth (Levine, 2005).7  There is no general consensus in the 
literature about the factors that should be taken into account in explaining financial development, 
nor what indicators of that development are most reliable.  In the choice of the latter, we ground our 
analyses on the recent attempt by Beck et al. (2008) to standardize the selection of financial 
development indicators.  Under this approach, the potential financial development indicators are 
ranked on the basis of the following criteria:  (a) the directness of their linkages to welfare, (b) the 
goodness of fit of regressions that explain variations in them, (c) their coverage in terms of 
countries and years, and, (d) the degree to which an indicator is stable within a country from year to 
year, but varies substantially across countries.8
In most of our analysis we use the two standard indicators, namely the ratio of liquid 
liabilities in the banking system to GDP and the ratio of credit to private sector to GDP.  Both 
measures score among the highest based on all four criteria listed above.  They score especially high 
relative to others on the first criterion, because they are robustly associated with long-run economic 
growth (Levine 2005; Levine, Loayza, and Beck, 2000).  Moreover, our analysis is rooted in 
banking indicators because banks hold the vast majority of financial sector assets in Africa and 
7 As in other recent papers, we use these variables, including growth, to describe financial development (Cull and 
Effron, 2008; Cull, Senbet, and Sorge, 2005). By contrast, in the finance and growth literature, the financial indicators 
are among the explanatory variables used to explain growth. 
8 Beck et al. (2008) call this the ratio of within sample variance to between sample variance. They worry that high 
within-country variation may reflect measurement errors or a high degree of co-movement with the business cycle. 
They argue that indicators of financial development are (or at least should be) better suited to measuring longer-term 
differences across countries rather than fluctuations along the cycle for a given country. 
9other developing countries.9  Despite this, we perform some robustness checks using measures of 
stock market development as indicators of financial development.  
In the choice of the explanatory variables for financial development, we rely again on 
previous studies, in particular those on the finance-growth nexus (e.g., Levine, 2005) and from other 
studies that analyze the determinants of financial development (e.g., Beck et. al, 2008; Cull and 
Effron, 2008).  These studies (in particular, Beck et al. 2008) regress the indicators of financial 
development on a set of variables that describe the environment in which such development takes 
place, but that are exogenous to that process such as population size and density, natural resources 
and offshore centers. They also include per capita income as an exogenous regressor, claiming that 
its effect on financial development is contemporaneous while the effect of financial development on 
income is lagged. The residuals from those regressions, therefore, provide an indication of the 
extent to which the chosen government policies promote financial development.  
However, as our objective is to benchmark African financial development relative to a set of 
variables that have been robustly associated with financial development in countries outside of 
Africa, especially in low and middle income countries, we expand further the set of regressors by 
including macroeconomic variables, such as inflation, real growth, and the current account balance, 
broad measures of institutional development, and variables describing banking sector structure.  We 
stress from the outset that we are not necessarily estimating causal relationships for the expanded 
set of regressors.  For ease of exposition, however, we refer to all explanatory variables as 
determinants of financial development throughout the paper.   
9 The ratio of private credit to GDP can include lending by nonbank financial institutions. As Table 2 shows, though, the 
correlations between private credit/GDP and stock market capitalization, and those between liquid liabilities/GDP and 
stock market capitalization/GDP are of similar magnitude (0.65 and 0.68), suggesting that the private credit measure is 
not driven by the activities of nonbank financial institutions involved in stock market transactions.  
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II.1 Regression Model 
We begin the introduction of our regression model with the dependent variable: 
Financial Development indicator (FDi): This measures an indicator of financial 
development in country i. We average our indicators of financial development and our explanatory 
variables over multiple years (from 2001 to 2005), as is customary in the literature on financial 
development and growth so as to reduce the influence of outliers. We therefore have only one 
observation per country. The results are qualitatively similar when we use all yearly observations 
from 1990 to 2006 in panel regressions, and when we lag the explanatory variables in either the 
panel regressions or the cross-sectional regressions.  Because our goal is to describe a general 
picture of the factors that are robustly linked to financial development, however, we present below 
only the simplest cross-country regressions in which the financial indicators and explanatory 
variables are contemporaneous.10
The regression model for the expanded set of explanatory variables is: 
(1) FDi =  + 1Populationi Exogenous determinants, based on Beck et al.
                + 2Population Densityi (2008) 
                + 3Natural Resourcesi
                +4Offshore Centeri
                +5Per Capita Incomei Plausibly exogenous, Financial development  
                +6Population*GDP Per Capitai affects these variables at a lag, Beck et al. (2008) 
                +7Real GDP Growth Ratei Macroeconomic variables 
                +8Inflation Ratei
                +9Current Account Balance/GDPi
                +10KKM Indexi Index of institutional development 
                +11Manufacturing/GDPi Other variables 
                +12Secondary/Primary enrolment
                + i
We briefly explain our variables below: 
10 For example, in the cross-sectional regression we average the explanatory variables from 1990 to 2000 and use them 
to explain financial development indicators averaged from 2001 to 2005.  In the panel regression, we lag the 
explanatory variables by one to three years. 
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Population: We measure population both with size and density and we expect both variables 
to be positively associated with financial development. A larger population should spur financial 
development due to scale and networking effects that make provision of financial services more 
efficient in larger economies. Population density, as measured by the number of residents per square 
kilometre, should have a positive coefficient in part because it is easier for financial institutions to 
accumulate savings when a higher number of potential depositors have easy access to them.  
Natural Resources: An abundance of natural resources may have a negative effect on 
financial development via the so-called “resource curse.” Consistent with this, Sachs and Warner 
(1995, 2001) offer evidence that resource-rich developing countries have grown more slowly since 
1960 than other developing countries.
We measure the intensity of a country’s reliance on natural resources by using a 
comprehensive approach that measures resource abundance based on trade indicators rather than 















The key advantage of this approach is that this measure of net exports is available for most 
countries and, as shown by Lederman and Maloney (2008), it is more closely linked to actual 
natural resource reserves than other trade-based endowment measures. If there is a resource curse 
and it impacts financial development, we would expect the coefficient on this variable to be 
negative.
Offshore Centers: The financial sectors of offshore centers are typically much larger than 
their economies would otherwise warrant.  We measure this effect with a dummy variable for 
offshore financial centers and we expect it to be positive.11
11 One could question whether this is an exogenous variable.  We follow Beck et al. (2008) in taking it as exogenous. 
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Per Capita Income: Per capita income is expected to be positively linked to financial 
development, because the volume and the sophistication of financial activities demanded is greater 
in richer countries and, on the supply side, richer economies can better exploit scale economies in 
the provision of financial services.  Per capita income reflects an aggregation of past growth, and 
hence its coefficient summarizes the long-run positive relationship between growth and financial 
development.  Moreover, per capita income may interact with population to produce even greater 
financial development than they do individually. We test this by including the interaction between 
those two variables in the regression.
Indicators of Macroeconomic Stability: Financial development is more likely in a sound 
macroeconomic environment and to measure this, we include real growth, inflation and the current 
account balance (relative to GDP) in the regressions.  
(a) Real growth: The effect of real growth on financial development is ambiguous. On the 
one hand, countries with rapid growth may be associated with greater financial development.  On 
the other hand, countries with higher levels of development, as reflected in GDP per capita, tend to 
have slower growth according to ‘conditional convergence’ (Levine and Renelt, 1992; Easterly and 
Levine, 1997).  Given that financial development indicators tend to be highly correlated with per 
capita income, it is likely that the faster growing countries will also tend to have lower levels of 
financial development.  We would therefore expect a negative coefficient for real growth in our 
financial development regressions.  The coefficient should also capture the negative short-run 
relationship between financial development and growth as emphasized in Loayza and Ranciere 
(2006).
(b) Inflation:  On the private credit side, inflation should slow financial development if it 
makes loan contracting over extended periods more difficult.  Inflation could also have a dampening 
effect on liquid liabilities, making depositors more hesitant to place their savings in the formal 
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financial system for fear of not being able to get them back quickly enough.  Therefore, we expect 
the coefficient for inflation to be negative in our regressions.
(c) Current Account Balance: The current account balance can be seen as a rough indicator 
of the health of the macroeconomic environment, and we thus expect it to be positively associated 
with our financial indicators. 
Institutional Development: We include in the regression KKM, which is the measure of 
broad institutional development created by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Maztruzzi (2007).  Institutional 
development has been found to foster financial development in developing countries (Cull and 
Effron, 2008), and thus we expect a positive coefficient for KKM in our regressions. 
Manufacturing: We include the share of GDP generated by the manufacturing sector. 
Industrial sectors that are relatively more in need of finance tend to grow faster in countries with 
well-developed financial sectors (Rajan and Zingales, 1998).  Manufacturing encompasses a broad 
variety of activities that tend to rely heavily on external finance so that we expect countries with a 
large manufacturing sector to have well-developed complementary financial institutions.  We 
therefore expect a positive coefficient for manufacturing in our regressions.  
Secondary/Primary enrollment: Finally, we want to measure the impact of risk management 
on financial development.  The idea is that a lack of capacity in risk management may be a deterrent 
to banking sector development and broader financial sector development (e.g., stock markets).  As 
measuring financial capabilities across countries directly is not possible, we proxy risk management 
capability with the ratio of secondary to primary school enrolment and we expect its coefficient to 
be positive.  Our argument is that risk management capability is fundamentally a question of human 
capital development and thus of talented financial people. 
The summary statistics and the correlations between the key variables appear in Tables 1 
and 2.  Table 1 shows that the mean values for the financial indicators are uniformly lower in Africa 
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than the rest of the world, measured in terms of liquid liabilities, private credit provision, and stock 
market development.  We also see marked differences in the explanatory variables between Africa 
and the rest of the world, particularly with respect to population density, per capita income, current 
account balance/GDP and institutional development as proxied by the KKM index. 
  The correlations in Table 2 are instructive.  All indicators of financial development  -liquid 
liabilities/GDP, private credit/GDP, stock market capitalization/GDP, and stock market value 
traded/GDP-  are highly correlated; and population density is positively associated with two of 
them, liquid liabilities/GDP and stock market capitalization/GDP.  The macro economic variables 
are strongly associated with the measures of financial development in an expected way.  In 
particular, there is a negative relationship between the financial development indicators and both 
inflation and real growth, and a positive relationship between the indicators and the current account 
balance.  However, the relationship with real growth is weaker than the other macro variables.  The 
KKM index of institutional development is strongly and positively associated with all of the 
indicators of financial development.  The same holds for the log of per capita income.  This is 
indicative of a positive long-run relationship between finance and growth.  Finally, the 
secondary/primary school enrollment is positively associated with the measures of financial 
development 
II.2 Empirical Results at Cross-Country Level: The African Financial Development Gap
To benchmark African financial development, we estimate regression Equation (1) for 
countries outside Africa, which enables us predict what African financial development should be 
based on the experience of these other countries.  Specifically, we first run the regressions 
excluding all African countries, and we derive out-of-sample predictions for African financial 
development.  Then we compare these predictions with the actual levels of African financial 
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development to measure the development gap.12  We present models for all countries and for low 
and middle income countries separately in Table 3.  The latter are more reflective of the African 
experience.
A.  Benchmarking Results for the Determinants of Financial Development 
The results for regression Equation (1) are presented in Table 3. The signs of almost all of 
the coefficients are as predicted and many of them are significant.  When we use the full sample of 
countries and the limited set of regressors as a benchmark, (see Columns 1 and 5), only the Per 
Capita Income Variable is positively associated with both indicators of banking development, while 
our proxy for Natural Resource intensity is negatively linked to those indicators.  Population 
Density and Offshore Financial Center are significantly positive in the liquid liabilities regression 
(Column 1) but not the private credit regression (Column 5).  When we benchmark to a sample of 
only low and middle income countries, using the limited set of regressors  (Columns 3 and 7), the 
Offshore Financial Center is highly significant for both indicators, while the Per Capita Income and 
Population Density variables are positive and significant, but only in the private credit regression.13
The expanded regression results, where we include macroeconomic, institutional, and other 
explanatory variables, are presented in Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8. The results show that Real Growth is 
negative and significant (or very nearly so) for both private credit and liquid liabilities for both 
samples of countries that we use. This indicates that the fastest growing countries tend to have the 
12 The same approach has been used, for example, to assess whether the levels of foreign direct investment received by 
China are abnormally high, or whether they can be explained by fundamentals (Fan, Morck, Xu, and Yeung, 2008). 
13 These results are similar to those in Beck et al., (2008). Aside from our proxy for natural resource intensity, our 
regressions differ from theirs in two ways. First, we use the more conservative cross-sectional approach, whereas they 
use the full panel. We choose to do this because errors from observations from the same country are likely to be 
correlated with one another. This could artificially deflate standard errors, thus increasing the significance level of 
coefficients. For robustness, we ran our models also on the full panel and qualitative results are similar. Second, they 
include a poverty gap variable in their regressions, which is the proportion of the population under the poverty line, 
times the average distance from the poverty line (Source: Povcal Net, World Bank). Since the poverty gap is so tightly 
linked to income levels, they use the residuals from a regression of the poverty gap on income in their regressions. We 
did the same, but the variable provided little explanatory power and reduced our sample. Also, unlike the other variables 
in our analysis, the poverty counts are based on surveys that do not occur at regular intervals, and thus the panel is 
highly unbalanced. For these reasons, we present models without the poverty gap variable. 
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least-developed financial sectors, providing support for conditional convergence.  As discussed 
earlier, this is likely a reflection of a short-run relationship between financial development and 
growth (the positive significant coefficient for per capita income summarizes the long run 
relationship between accumulated growth and financial development).  Inflation is negative and 
highly significant across financial indicators and country samples.  The coefficients are similar in 
size for the full set of countries and for the low and middle income countries, indicating that 
macroeconomic instability is strongly linked to financial under-development even in developing 
countries.  The Current Account Balance/GDP is strongly positively linked to both indicators for 
both samples, though coefficients are larger for the low and middle income sample.  In short, the 
coefficients support our hypotheses and indicate strong links between macroeconomic outcomes 
and financial development. 
Our proxy for the degree of institutional development, as represented by the KKM index, is 
positive and highly significant across financial indicators and samples, providing support for the 
notion that broad institutional development helps to foster financial development.  The coefficients 
are larger for the full-country sample than for the sample of low and middle income countries, but 
they are still large even in the latter case: a one-point increase in the KKM index (5-point scale) is 
associated with a 22 percentage point increase in liquid liabilities/GDP and a 21 percentage point 
increase for the private credit ratio.  Finally, in the expanded models, the offshore financial center 
variable is significant for both indicators for low and middle income countries.   
B.  Predicted Versus Actual African Financial Development
We now use the regression coefficients in Table 3 to derive a predicted level of financial 
development for each country in Africa. Because they are likely to be more reflective of the African 
experience, as our benchmark we rely on the models that include only low and middle income 
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countries.14  Again, we are not claiming that the relationships we find in Table 3 are causal.  Rather, 
we are asking what the level of financial development would be if the same relationships held in 
Africa as in the rest of the developing world.  To the extent that predicted and actual levels of 
financial development are similar, one can say that African financial development is about what it 
should be.
1.  African financial development gap: Liquid liabilities. Figure 1shows that only seven of thirty-
one countries have levels of liquid liabilities/GDP which are at or above their predicted levels.  Of 
those, three (Angola, Sierra Leone, and Zambia) are huddled in the lower left hand corner of the 
figure where actual and predicted values are very low. Because the predicted values are based on 
linear regressions, they tend to be very near zero for these countries.15  That their actual levels 
exceed zero by some small amount is little consolation.  To a lesser extent the same is true of 
Mozambique.  Ethiopia has predicted and actual levels of liquid liabilities that are quite similar.  
The result on Ethiopia seems surprising given the country is known to have undertaken few 
financial sector reforms and has a banking system dominated by the government.  While state-
owned banks collect deposits, it unlikely that they intermediate (lend) well. In fact, the dominant 
bank in Ethiopia was known to have a high accumulation of liquidity and idle funds during the 
sample period, and the relatively high level of liquid liabilities (relative to GDP) may be reflective 
of excess liquidity.  Overall, there are only two countries, namely Cape Verde and Mauritius – 
among the smallest in Africa – that exceed their predicted levels by a substantial amount, but 
neither of the two is particularly reflective of the African experience.  
As Figure 1 shows, twenty countries have levels of liquid liabilities that are more than ten 
14 We also tried to estimate models based only on low income countries outside of Africa, but there were too few 
observations to generate meaningful results. 
15 Indeed, for Angola the predicted value is negative (and large in absolute value). This is due to its high average GDP 
growth (10.6%), low KKM score (-.71), and high inflation (86.4% per year). Negative levels of financial development 
are not, however, possible. For countries that have negative predicted values, we reset them to zero in both the figures. 
The calculations are discussed in the text. 
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percentage points below their predicted levels. The worst ten performers, for example, range 
between 24 and 47 percentage points below.  The average country falls 13 percentage points short 
of its predicted level, which is quite sizable, given that the average ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP 
hovered between 26.5 and 30.9% from 2001 to 2005. 
2. African financial development gap: Private Credit: As shown in Figure 2, the level of private 
credit/GDP for African countries lies far below predicted levels. Again, only seven countries exceed 
their predicted levels and only Mauritius does so by more than ten percentage points.  Of the 
twenty-four countries with predicted levels that are higher than their actual private credit ratios, 
seventeen fall short by more than ten percentage points.  The ten poorest performers range from 22 
to 34 percentage points below their predicted levels, and the average country falls short of its 
predicted level by 12 points.  The magnitude of this measure of under-performance is quite large 
when one considers that the average ratio of private credit to GDP stood at 15.5% in 2005. 
The gap in the observed African financial development, relative to what is predicted by the 
benchmark determinants, is stark. The levels of liquid liabilities to GDP for African countries are 
about two-thirds the level predicted by statistical relationships that hold elsewhere in the developing 
world.  Private credit ratios are even lower, slightly better than half their predicted levels. There is 
also general consistency in rankings across the two indicators.  Of the bottom ten performers in 
terms of liquid liabilities, seven are also among the bottom performers in terms of private credit, 
and the correlation for the differences between predicted and actual levels for the two measures of 
financial development is 0.85.  Our results point to systematic under-performance relative to the 
fundamentals that have been associated with banking sector development in the rest of the world.
To analyze this gap more in depth, in the next sections we look at whether the factors in our base 
models relate to African financial development differently than to financial development in the rest 
of the world. 
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III. Are the Determinants of African Financial Development Different? 
So far we have defined under-development in African financial sectors in terms of the 
determinants of financial sector development in other parts of the developing world.  However, the 
course of African financial sector development might depend on a different set of factors than those 
that have been important elsewhere.16  While we are reluctant to accept that African financial 
sectors have a distinct model of development, it seems plausible that some factors may be 
somewhat more or less important in the African context.  To see whether this is indeed the case, as a 
first step, we estimate the model in Table 4 for the sample of African countries.  Note that this 
method essentially accepts that the level of financial development in Africa is lower than that in the 
rest of the developing world, and then tries to explain variation around the African mean based on 
the explanatory variables in our base models. Still, the results are instructive.17
First, population density is much more strongly linked to both liquid liabilities/GDP and 
private credit/GDP than it was elsewhere in the world.  In fact, among the set of exogenous factors 
in the regression Equation (1), population density is the only one that is robustly linked to our 
indicators of banking development for Africa.  Moreover, the interaction between population and 
per capita income is positive and significant in two of the private credit regressions, although not 
when South Africa is dropped from the African sample.  This is reasonable, given the relatively 
high level of economic development of this country.  Second, among the factors that explain 
financial development in the rest of the developing world, only the KKM index of institutional 
development seems relevant for Africa but only for the liquid liabilities measure.  
 The other additional factors in the expanded regressions in Table 4 are less important in 
Africa than elsewhere.  Real growth is not significant.  We argued earlier that the negative, 
16  It may also be that the factors explaining financial development in Africa are the same as for the other countries but 
these factors load up or contribute differently in the African context. We are open to either interpretation.     
17 Note that the offshore financial center variable does not appear in Table 4 because no African countries qualify. 
20
significant coefficient for growth in the rest of the developing world was consistent with conditional 
convergence, because it indicated that the least financially developed countries had higher current 
growth rates.  The non-result for Africa suggests that such convergence did not occur there, a point 
which was also made for some African countries in Pritchett (1997).  In addition, neither inflation 
nor the current account balance is significant in the African regressions, whereas both were highly 
significant in the rest of the world as shown in Table 3.  The poor results for inflation, the current 
account, and growth indicate that the macroeconomic fundamentals that are associated with 
financial development in other developing countries have not been important in Africa.18
III.1. A Closer Look at Differences in Financial Development Factors 
The models in Table 4 provide a strong initial indication that the factors associated with 
banking development in Africa differ from those in the rest of the world.  However, those African 
models are based on only a small number of observations.  To address the small sample issue we re-
run our models for all low and middle income countries (including Africa) and include an 
interaction between each of our explanatory variables and an Africa dummy variable.  We also 
include an Africa dummy variable on its own to test whether the constant for Africa in our 
regressions is the same as in the rest of the developing world.  This is akin to a seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR), but the coefficients on the interactions terms enable us to make more precise 
statements about whether the effects for Africa are statistically different than for the rest of the 
developing world and from zero (i.e., there is no effect).
18 The results on macroeconomic fundamentals suggest that African countries were able to avoid the financial roller-
coaster ride associated with macroeconomic instability that other countries experienced during this period. However, 
this apparent benefit might have come at a substantial opportunity cost associated with the same low levels of financial 
development during this period.  To some extent, therefore, our benchmark regressions used to predict African financial 
sector development give credit to some African countries for having relatively low initial levels of development, stable 
prices, and a current account surplus. These factors contribute to higher predicted financial development than has 
actually occurred. 
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The results are presented in Table 5.  In the simplest regressions, we include the Africa 
dummy and the limited set of regressors (Columns 1 and 4).  The Africa dummy is negative for both 
indicators but it is significant only in the liquid liabilities regression.  Per capita income is positive 
and significant for both indicators; and it remains positive when the Africa interactions are 
introduced (Columns 2 and 5), although it then becomes insignificant in the liquid liabilities 
regression.  Moreover, per capita income is not significant when we introduce the African 
interaction terms for the expanded set of regressors (Columns 3 and 6).  The offshore financial 
center variable is positive and significant across all specifications, though again no African country 
qualifies as an offshore center and so there is no Africa interaction for the variable. 
The most relevant explanatory variable for Africa is again population density.  When only 
the limited set of regressors is included in the regression, population density is positive and highly 
significant for both indicators of financial development (Columns 1 and 4).  When the Africa 
dummy is interacted with the limited set of regressors (Columns 2 and 5), the relationship is still 
positive but weaker in terms of significance. When interactions are included for the expanded set of 
regressors (Columns 3 and 6), the variable remains positive but is no longer significant.  Despite the 
insignificance of the density variable in models 3 and 6, we reject that the sum of the coefficients 
for density and its interaction with the Africa dummy is zero at the p = 0.1 level for those models 
(see F-statistics near the bottom of Table 5).  Therefore, the relationship between population density 
and our banking development indicators for African countries is significantly different from zero, 
but not for the rest of the developing world in our most expansive models. 
In contrast, the relationship between natural resource intensity and banking indicators is 
about the same in Africa as it is in the rest of the developing world.  The coefficient for our proxy of 
natural resource intensity is negative but tends not to be significant in most of the models; the 
coefficient for its interaction with the Africa dummy is never significant. Thus, we reject the 
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hypothesis that the relationship between natural resources and banking development is somehow 
different for Africa.  In other words, the relatively low levels of banking development cannot be 
attributable to the natural resource curse being more severe in Africa than in other parts of the 
developing world. Aside from the negative significant coefficient in model 3 (for liquid liabilities), 
the results provide little support for a resource curse in terms of financial development outside 
Africa as well.  
Concerning the regressors that are only included in the expanded set, the coefficient for real 
growth is negative and highly significant for both indicators of financial development (Columns 3 
and 6).  The coefficient for the Africa*growth interaction is positive and insignificant; but, we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that the sum of the two coefficients (growth and Africa*growth) is zero 
(again see F-statistics near the bottom of Table 5).  This indicates again that the conditional 
convergence result does not hold in Africa, as was suggested by our simple comparison of the 
coefficients from the base model (Table 3) with those from the African models (Table 4). 
 Similar results hold for the inflation variable which remains negative and highly significant 
when the interactions are included in the regressions. The interaction between inflation and the 
Africa dummy is positive, marginally significant, and of a magnitude similar to that of the simple 
inflation variable.  We cannot, therefore, reject the hypothesis that the sum of the inflation and 
Africa*inflation variables is zero, which indicates that, like real growth, inflation also has not been 
associated with less financial development in Africa. 
A similar pattern also holds for the current account balance and KKM index of institutional 
development variables.  Both sets of coefficients are positive and significant in both specifications 
(Columns 3 and 6), but their signs are negative when interacted with the Africa dummy variable.  
We cannot reject the hypothesis that the sum of the two coefficients is equal to zero for both 
variables; that is, neither the current account balance nor KKM index is positively related to African 
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banking development.  The regressions that include interaction terms therefore indicate that the high 
predicted levels of financial development for Africa from our base models derive, in part, from 
macroeconomic factors that matter only outside Africa.  
B.  Toward Resolving the African Finance Puzzle
Are the determinants of financial development different in Africa?  The more refined 
analysis in Table 5 indicates that the determinants of banking development in Africa differ from 
other developing countries in significant ways.  Of particular interest is the set of factors that matter 
outside Africa but not in Africa, and those that matter in Africa but not in the rest of the world.
While macroeconomic variables and the KKM index of institutional development appear to 
be important determinants of banking development in the rest of the developing world, they lose 
power in the context of Africa. We also observe that the notion of a natural resource curse, which is 
largely popularized in the context of resource-rich countries such as those in Africa, is insignificant 
in explaining the African financial development gap. The one explanatory variable that stands out 
for Africa is population density.  Our results show a steeper relationship between population density 
and banking indicators for Africa than the rest of the developing world. 
In general, the differences between the predicted and actual values of financial development 
for Africa become smaller when the interaction terms are included in the regressions.  In fact, the 
average difference for the models with full interactions is very close to zero.  No difference is 
greater than 0.06 or less than -0.06 for either indicator of banking development.  The majority of the 
predicted values lie within two percentage points of their actual levels.  The simple Africa dummy, 
which is really a measure of our ignorance about what drives African financial development, tends 
not to be significant (and never achieves  significance at better than the ten percent level).   
Our findings suggest that, if mechanisms for holding down inflation, generating a current 
account surplus, and conditional convergence were to work in Africa as elsewhere, the levels of 
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financial development would be higher.  At the same time, it remains an open question as to why 
those mechanisms do not seem to work in Africa.  Perhaps a period of sustained economic growth 
will ignite those mechanisms, but the African puzzle continues in a different form.19
C.  Additional Tests and Robustness Checks  
We now perform additional tests and robustness checks.  In particular, we analyze in further 
depth the role of population density, which shows up more strongly in Africa than elsewhere.  
Moreover, we consider indicators of stock market development to test whether a gap similar to the 
one found for banking development indicators arises in the context of stock markets.  Although 
stock markets still remain small and illiquid, African countries seem to have committed to the 
equity sector in promoting financial development and several stock exchanges have emerged in 
Africa in the recent past.   
1. Population density: We try to better understand why sparsely populated African countries have 
low levels of banking development by, first, examining the ‘shape’ of the relationship between 
density and financial development based on our regression models and, second, including additional 
variables related to population density in the regressions.
 Figure 3 shows the relationship between population density and liquid liabilities/GDP for 
the typical African and non-African developing country based on Table 5.  Specifically, the vertical 
axis plots predicted values from Model 2 in Table 5.  For all variables other than population density, 
we use the mean value for the subsample (either Africa or other developing countries) multiplied by 
the appropriate coefficient for that subsample.  For population density, we run through the range of 
possible values and multiply by the appropriate coefficient for each subsample to generate the 
19 Another possibility is that variables that are important for African financial development are omitted from our 
models. For example, Easterly and Levine (1997) demonstrate that ethnic fractionalization explains a large share of 
factors that are linked to (slow) growth within Africa. We experimented with two types of variables: fractionalization 
and armed conflict. We use the fractionalization data as in Alesina et al. (2003); and we use the UCDP/PRIO dataset to 
calculate the average number of armed conflicts per year for each country. Neither variable is significant in our banking 
development regressions, and their inclusion does not alter the main qualitative results of our models. 
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curvature.  Hence, non-population density factors (partially) account for the distance between the 
curves for Africa and that for other developing countries. 
Three features of the graph for liquid liabilities in Figure 3 are worth noting: (1) the largest 
differences between Africa and the rest of the developing world come at the lower end of the 
density scale; (2) population density affects financial development in all countries but the 
relationship is much steeper for Africa; and (3) although African countries tend to have lower 
population densities, there is substantial overlap for the two samples, which suggests that 
comparisons across the full range of the density spectrum are valid.  The picture points to important 
differences between Africa and the rest of the world, which could be due to the fact that the 
minimum viable scale in banking is greater in Africa than elsewhere or to other institutional or 
infrastructural failures.  Regardless of the explanation, Figure 3 highlights Africa’s difficulty in 
overcoming problems related to scale for the least densely populated countries. 
 Similarly to Figure 3, Figure 4 shows the relationship between population density and 
private credit/GDP based on the coefficients of Model 5 in Table 5.  As in the figure for liquid 
liabilities/GDP, the gap between Africa and the rest of the developing world is largest at the lowest 
levels of population density.  However, unlike for the liquid liabilities measure, that gap does not
dramatically close at intermediate density levels.  This suggests that while differences in minimum 
viable scale could explain differences between Africa and the rest of the developing world with 
respect to savings, they cannot account for Africa’s lower levels of private credit over the full range 
of population densities.
  To understand the aspects of population density that contribute to low levels of banking 
development in Africa, we include additional variables in our regressions that summarize (1) spatial 
population characteristics, such as large population agglomerations, (2) infrastructural and 
transportation development, and (3) physical banking presence (i.e., branch penetration measures). 
26
The results of these new regressions can help understand what policies may be effective in fostering 
African development.  If population agglomeration and infrastructural development can account for 
most of the strong relationship between population density and banking under-development in 
Africa, provision of financial services might improve as a natural consequence of broader 
economic/infrastructural improvements or policies that specifically encourage economic 
participation by those that live outside urban agglomerates.  On the other hand, if measures of bank 
branch penetration are better able to account for the density/banking development relationship in 
Africa, then it is more likely that specific banking market failures, perhaps related to relatively high 
minimum viable scale, are at the heart of African under-performance. 
For spatial population characteristics, we include the percentage of the population residing 
in the largest city, the percent of the population in urban agglomerates, and a measure of population 
concentration with zero indicating a uniform distribution of residents across 20km by 20km cells 
and one indicating that the entire population is concentrated in a single 20km by 20km cell.  For 
infrastructural development we include roads per square km and railroad track per square km.  For 
bank penetration, we include commercial bank branches per 100,000 residents (demographic 
penetration) and branches per sq. km (geographic penetration).  Inclusion of many of these variables 
reduces sample size substantially and their coefficients are insignificant.  The results for the 
variables that do produce significant results (roads per sq.km, percentage of population in the 
largest city, and the two branch penetration measures) are presented in Table 6.
The population density variable is no longer significant when any of these variables are 
introduced to the liquid liabilities regressions (in fact it becomes negative and significant when the 
geographic branch penetration variable is included), suggesting that roads, population in major 
cities, and bank branch penetration are all relevant factors in understanding the strong link between 
population density and financial development in Africa. That said, only the coefficients for the 
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percentage of population in the largest city and the geographic bank branch penetration measure are 
consistently significant across the models in Table 6.  This pattern is consistent with the notion that 
physical proximity to providers of financial services accounts for much of the variation in African 
banking development and thus the minimum viable scale is best achieved in major cities.   
It is also worth noting that the links to financial development for the geographic penetration 
and largest city population variables are significant for liquid liabilities to GDP but not for private 
credit to GDP.  Again, overcoming difficulties associated with population density appears more 
effective on the savings side than on the credit side.  
2.  Stock market development: We replace our indicators of banking development with indicators 
of stock market development, namely stock market capitalization and the value of traded shares, 
each divided by GDP, and re-run the models in Table 5. These are yearly observations that we 
average over the sample period for each country as described above.  We are unable to run our base 
models from Table 6 on the sample of African countries because so few of them have indicators of 
stock market development.   
The results (not reported) are notable only because none of the variables that are associated 
with stock market development in the rest of the developing world are important in Africa.  That is, 
we cannot reject the hypothesis that the relationship between any of the variables in our models and 
our indicators of African stock market development is zero.  This is very likely attributable to the 
early stage of development of stock markets in Africa.  Once these stock markets are better 
established, it might be easier to analyze the determinants of their development via cross-country 
regressions.20
20 Moreover, Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005) find that stock market liberalization, leading to free flows of capital 
in and out of a home country’s equity markets, has a causal and positive impact on economic growth. But for most 
African countries the stock market development (and associated institutions) has not reached the stage of liberalization. 
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IV. Firm-level Tests on the Access to External Finance 
As mentioned earlier, while cross-country studies focusing on country-level variables are 
highly useful for summarizing patterns in the data and identifying relationships between variables, 
they are subject to methodological issues.  For example, the observed results may be driven by 
measurement errors or unobservable factors.  In an attempt to overcome these potential problems, 
we next turn to firm-level data drawn from the Investment Climate Surveys (ICS) conducted by the 
World Bank over the past decade.21  Our specific reasons for augumenting the cross-country study 
with the firm-level analysis are as follows:  First, while country level indicators of banking 
development might suffer from measurement errors, firm-level responses about their use of 
financial services should not. Second, our cross-country level regressions involve one observation 
per country and thus have fewer degrees of freedom than what are available in firm-level 
regressions. Third, the firm-level data sets allow us to control for a number of potentially relevant 
firm characteristics (e.g., size, sector) that could explain substantial variation in the demand for, and 
use of, financial services.  Thus, overall the firm-level regressions can provide more precise 
estimates of the relationships between financial development and our explanatory variables than the 
country-level regressions.  Furthermore, to the extent that we derive similar qualitative results for 
the firm- and country-level regression, it provides additional, and even stronger, support for the 
conclusions that we have drawn to this point based only on the country-level regressions. 
Table 7 presents summary statistics on our firm-level sample.  Firm characteristics (all 
dummy variables) include size (small, medium, and large based on the number of employees), 
industry (manufacturing, services, and others), exporter status and foreign ownership status.  It 
appears that there are more small firms and non-exporting firms in the African (excluding South 
Africa) sample than in other developing countries, while the fraction of firms with foreign 
21 These surveys have been used frequently in recent cross-country, firm-level studies on law, institutions, finance and 
growth (e.g., Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2005; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2005). 
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ownership stakes is higher in the African sample.  Firm financing sources, for both short term 
(working capital) and long term (new investments) purposes, include internal (e.g., retained 
earnings) and external channels.  Following prior research, we focus on long term external 
financing from financial institutions, the most important external financing channel in most 
developing countries.  Specifically, the external finance dummy equals one if a firm has access to 
loans from domestic or foreign banks, or credit card debts from these institutions; and zero 
otherwise.  Almost 84% (74%) of firms in Africa (other developing countries) do not have access to 
external finance under this definition.22
Our basic strategy is to pattern our firm-level regressions on the country-level regressions, 
but also to include variables that summarize firm characteristics.  We note, however, that we have 
all of the necessary variables for firms from only twelve countries in Africa.  Since the standard 
errors in our models allow for clustering at the country level, we are not able to include all of the 
country-level regressors that were in the cross-country regressions in Table 5.  However, the most 
important regressors are included.23  Since the majority of firms in Africa and elsewhere do not 
have access to external finance (Table 7), our dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the 
firm received any financing from a formal provider, rather than a continuous variable showing the 
importance of institutional finance among all financing sources.24  Table 8 reports the marginal 
effects from Probit regressions. 
22 We only include firm observations for which data is available on whether the firm has access to all three external 
financing channels (domestic and foreign banks and credit cards).  Summary statistics reported in Table 7 represent the 
sample we use in regressions reported in Table 8.  
23 We performed a series of robustness checks in which we added each of the country-level variables from the country-
level regressions in Table 5 that do not appear in the firm-level regressions in Table 8, one at a time.  Qualitative results 
are very similar to those reported in Table 8. 
24 For the surveys completed through 2006, the dummy variable is equal to one if the firm reported a positive value for 
finance from local banks, foreign banks or credit cards. For the surveys after 2006, those questions were broadened to 
ask whether firms received finance from private or state owned commercial banks, or from non-bank financial 
institutions. Since banks are the main providers of financial services throughout the developing world, this slight change 
in question format does not present a major problem.  Regression results are very similar when we include a post-2006 
dummy variable.  
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In the baseline model, population density is once again positive and significantly associated 
with firms’ access to external finance (Column 1).  The coefficient on the interaction between the 
Africa dummy and population density indicates that there is no difference in the impact of this 
variable for African and non-African firms.  Moreover, we can reject that the sum of the 
coefficients for density and its interaction with the Africa dummy is zero at the p = 0.05 level for 
this model (see chi-squared statistics near the bottom of Table 8). In Model 2 we add road coverage 
(per sq. km) and find it is actually negatively associated with African firms’ access to external 
finance while it has a positive impact for firms from other developing nations. On the other hand, 
adding this variable strengthens the (marginally positive) impact of population density for African 
firms as the interaction with the African dummy is significant at 10% and the sum of the density 
and Africa*density coefficients is positive and significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
(Column 2).     
Another main result from Table 8 is that both the geographic and demographic bank branch 
penetration variables have a positive association with access to external finance for African 
countries.  However, the result is significant only for geographic penetration (at 1% in Column 4).  
These variables are insignificant and of smaller magnitudes in the rest of the developing world.  
Population density remains positive and significant for non-African countries when the variables for 
demographic and geographic bank branch penetration enter the regression (Columns 4 and 5).  We 
can no longer reject that the sum of the coefficients for population density and its interaction with 
the Africa dummy is zero in the model with geographic branch penetration (though we continue to 
do so when demographic penetration enters the regression in model 5).  The results for geographic 
branch penetration thus confirm those from the country-level regressions.  Thus, both cross-country 
and firm-level regressions point to the importance of physical proximity to providers of financial 
services in Africa relative to the rest of the developing world.  General infrastructural failures are 
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not necessarily responsible for low levels of access to external finance for African firms, but rather 
the failures seem endemic to the banking sectors and markets for debt instruments. 
In Table 8 we also introduce foreign bank ownership (at the country level) as an explanatory 
variable. We did not include this variable in the country-level regressions (Tables 3-5) because we 
view this as an ‘outcome’ variable for the development status of a country’s banking sector. 
However, this variable is plausibly exogenous from the point of view of small, privately owned 
firms in a given region.  This variable is negatively associated with access to external finance for 
firms from the developing world (Column 3), and for Africa (see F-statistic for foreign ownership 
plus its interaction with the Africa dummy variable at the bottom of column 3). We cannot reject 
that the sum of the coefficients for population density and its interaction with the Africa dummy is 
zero in this model, suggesting some interplay between foreign bank presence in Africa and 
population density.25
Finally, we note that firm characteristics explain a substantial amount of variation in firms’ 
access to external finance, supporting the notion that firm-level regressions offer more precise 
estimates than the country-level regressions.  The similarities and differences between Africa and 
the rest of the developing world are also instructive.  Firm size affects the use of external finance 
similarly in Africa and elsewhere, with smaller firms being at a substantial disadvantage relative to 
larger ones.  Foreign-owned firms use less external finance than local firms in Africa and elsewhere, 
perhaps because they have access to non-local sources of finance such as their parent companies.  
Differences also arise with respect to industry affiliation.  In the rest of the developing world, 
manufacturing firms rely more heavily on external finance than other firms.  In Africa, those firms 
show no strong tendency to rely on external finance more than others.  In addition, older firms are 
less likely to have access to external finance outside Africa; but more mature African firms appear 
25 The density variable remains negative and significant for the rest of the developing world when foreign bank 
ownership shares are included in the regression. 
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to have an advantage in acquiring such finance. 
We conclude our cross-country and firm-level analyses with some observations. The cross-
country approach allows us to measure the financial development gap between Africa and other 
developing economies and identify factors that are of particular relevance for Africa.  However, we 
recognize the limitations with cross-country studies, and hence attempt to address them in three 
ways.  First, we are cautious in drawing causation; we do, however, view variables, such as 
population density and natural resources endowment, as exogenous variables for predicting 
financial sector development.  Second, as noted above we complement our country-level tests with 
firm-level analyses, and the micro-level evidence is consistent with the country-level results.  In 
particular, both the cross-country and firm-level studies are consistent with the importance of 
overcoming low population density to achieve financial development in Africa.  Finally, we employ 
new data on the outreach of financial sectors, in particular bank branch penetration measures, to 
better understand the channels through which population density may affect different aspects of 
financial sector development.  Moreover, we explore whether transportation infrastructure, urban 
agglomeration, and the share of arable land are driving the strong relationship between population 
density and banking sector development in Africa. 
V. Within-country Study: Equity Bank and Financial Access in Kenya 
 Our cross-country and firm-level analyses both indicate that sparsely populated regions pose 
a particularly severe problem for African financial development. What types of financial institutions 
are best suited to providing services in such areas? A satisfactory answer to this question is well 
beyond the scope of the current paper, but in this section we examine the effects of the recent 
expansion of bank branch networks in Kenya to get some sense of the factors that drove a large 
increase in use of bank accounts and loans within a relatively short time period.  
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As background, we begin by noting that while economic growth over the past few decades 
has been disappointing in Africa, some countries began growing fast at the start of the 21st century, 
at least until the negative shock of the global crisis in 2007-2009. The GDP growth for the five year 
period running from 2002 to 2007 averaged over 5% in Africa, outpacing population growth and 
hence implying an increase in GDP per capita (Allen, Otchere, and Senbet, 2011). However, and as 
discussed earlier, despite the adoption of extensive economic and financial reforms, most Sub-
Saharan African countries still face a severe gap in the development of their financial sectors.  
Figure 5 shows the relationship between demographic bank penetration (measured by the 
number of bank branches per 100,000 people) and GDP per capita across low income economies in 
2003-2004. The figure suggests three stylized facts. First, there is a strong positive relationship 
between bank penetration and economic development. Second, Sub-Saharan African countries are 
characterized by both low income per capita and low bank branch penetration. Third, the bank 
branch network in Sub-Saharan African countries is underdeveloped relative to not only the higher 
income economies but other peers with similar income levels.  
The underdevelopment of the bank branch network in Sub-Saharan Africa has resulted in 
low access to banking services, as illustrated by our firm-level study (on the bank credit side). 
While in the early 2000s roughly half of the world’s adult population lacked any form of bank 
account, in Sub-Saharan Africa over eighty percent of the adult population lacked an account (Chaia 
et al. (2011) and Honohan (2008)). In line with these facts, Kendall et al. (2010) report that the 
average number of bank accounts per adult is 3.7 in developed countries, 0.9 in developing 
countries and less than 0.5 in Sub-Saharan African countries. 
The financial access problem in many Sub-Saharan countries and the emergence of new 
business models that may contribute to solve this problem deserve particular attention. In this 
respect, Kenya offers an interesting case study for financial access as in recent years it has 
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witnessed a strong bank branch expansion. This expansion has coincided with the emergence of 
Equity Bank, a pioneering commercial bank that devised a banking service strategy targeting low 
income clients and traditionally under-served territories. The bank is listed on the Nairobi Stock 
Exchange, it has no government ownership share, and it has played a key role in integrating 
provision of financial services to the under privileged with formal finance. Figure 6 shows the stock 
performance of Equity Bank during the period of August, 2006 to August 2011. It significantly 
outperforms two of its main competitors on this measure, Barclays Bank of Kenya and the Kenya 
Commercial Bank.  
The banking system in Kenya expanded greatly in terms of the number of branches in recent 
years. Table 9 reports that between 2006 and 2009 the total number of bank branches in Kenya 
increased from almost 600 to almost 1,000 (a 68% increase). This bank branch expansion occurred 
not only in urban districts but also in rural and arid and semi-arid districts. In percentage terms, this 
expansion was greater in the arid and semi-arid districts (112%), followed by rural districts (67%) 
and urban districts (62%). This expansion involved all ownership categories of banks, namely 
domestic private banks, foreign banks and government banks. However, as shown in Table 10, the 
expansion was particularly driven by domestic private banks, among which Equity Bank played an 
important role. The number of Equity Bank’s branches increased from 44 to 112 in the period 2006-
2009, representing an expansion of 155%. No other bank experienced such growth in the same 
period. The number of bank branches of Barclays and Kenya Commercial Bank (i.e., the banks with 
the largest branch networks after Equity Bank) increased from 62 to 119 and from 117 to 169, 
representing growth of 92% and 44% respectively.
Although most Kenyan banks have experienced branch expansion in recent years, banks 
with different ownership structures have followed different expansion strategies. While foreign 
banks prefer urban areas (perhaps in order to cherry-pick a set of elite customers), domestic private 
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banks seem to exploit their superior knowledge of the culture and have also entered rural and arid 
and semi-arid areas. For example, as part of its expansion strategy, Equity Bank focused on the use 
of local languages in its branches. This strategy is quite important considering that 30-40% of the 
people in central Kenya cannot speak either English or Swahili, and thus speak only a minority 
language.
As a first exploration of the bank branching strategies in Kenya, Figure 7 presents the 
number of bank branches in 2006 and 2009 for three bank groups: foreign banks, government-
owned and government-influenced banks, and domestic private banks.26  The figure shows the 
number of bank branches in districts that have been traditionally less attractive for major 
commercial banks: rural and arid and semi-arid districts, districts in which minority languages are 
more common, less populated districts and districts with low educational attainment levels.27  It 
suggests two stylized facts. First, domestic private banks and government and government 
influenced banks had greater presence in underdeveloped/more vulnerable districts, while foreign 
banks had the least presence in those districts. Second, the bank branch expansion of local private 
banks has been much stronger than the branch expansion of government banks and foreign banks. 
These patterns suggest that domestic private banks, whose expansion has been led by Equity Bank 
(see Table 10), played a vital role in fostering banking services in underdeveloped districts. 
The performance of Equity Bank over the last half decade has been impressive. It has 
experienced an explosive growth of its assets and a significant expansion of its banking services. 
Figure 8 shows that during the period 2006-2010 the assets of Equity Bank increased seven-fold; 
while its customers and customer deposits increased by a factor of six. In fact, Equity Bank ended 
26 Government-owned banks are those in which the government owns a majority of shares. In (the two) government-
influenced banks the government maintains a large, but non-controlling ownership share. Throughout most of the paper, 
we refer to both groups collectively as “government banks.”  
27 Rural, arid and semi-arid districts exclude Nairobi and Mombasa. High minority language districts are those where 
the share of the population speaking a minority language is greater than the median. Less populated districts are those 
where population density is less than the median. Districts with low educational attainment levels are those where the 
share of the population with secondary or tertiary education is less than the median. 
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the year 2010 with almost six million customers. Of these, 5.4 million are in Kenya, 474,000 are in 
Uganda and 28,000 are in South Sudan. As a consequence of this expansion, Equity Bank became 
the fifth largest bank in Kenya in terms of the share of gross assets and deposits of the whole system 
and is by far the bank with the largest number of deposit and loan accounts. The number of deposit 
and loan accounts of Equity Bank represents around the 50% and 30% of the total number of 
deposit and loan accounts in Kenya, respectively (see Table 11). These deposit and loan market 
shares suggest that the emergence of Equity Bank has played an important role in expanding the 
bank branch network to under-served territories and thus expanding the use of banking services to 
population segments ignored by other large traditional commercial banks. Moreover, these stylized 
facts suggest that Equity Bank’s model has not only expanded the use of financial services to 
broader segments of the population but it has also created profits in the process. As shown in Figure 
8, Equity Bank’s profits before taxes and shareholder funds have experienced a strong positive 
trend.
There is preliminary evidence that the bank branch expansion and emergence of Equity 
Bank have paid off in terms of access to banking services in Kenya. In fact, as reported in Table 12, 
the proportion of individuals having a bank account in Kenya increased considerably going from 14 
percent in 2006 to 23 percent in 2009. The proportion of individuals having a loan from a bank 
showed a more modest increase from 2.9 percent to 4.3 percent. This increase in access to banking 
services has coincided with a stronger presence of Equity Bank. While Equity Bank had branches in 
48% of the districts in Kenya in 2006, it had branches in 87% of them in 2009. 
In light of the preliminary evidence presented above, in an ongoing work Allen et al. (2011) 
explore the impact of Equity Bank, as well as other banks, on the use of banking services in Kenya 
by combining a new dataset on bank presence with household-level survey data in 2006 and 2009. 
The dataset on bank presence is based on branch-level information that is aggregated to construct a 
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district-level panel on the number of branches by bank (see Allen, et al, for details). The panel 
covers 45 commercial banks that operated in 65 Kenyan districts in the period between 2006 and 
2009.28  This new dataset allowed the authors to explore the relationship between bank expansion 
and access to banking services over time and to exploit within-district variation in bank presence. 
The household-level data is from the FinAccess surveys conducted by Financial Sector Deepening 
Trust Kenya (FSD Kenya) in 2006 and 2009. The 2006 survey consisted of 4,420 completed 
interviews, while the 2009 survey consisted of 6,598 completed interviews.  
Allen et al. (2011) find that the presence of domestic private banks, government banks or 
foreign banks has a positive impact on access to bank accounts at the district level.  Interestingly 
they also find that the presence of Equity Bank in a specific district is strongly positively related to 
the residents’ probability of having a bank account and/or a bank loan, which goes beyond the effect 
of bank branch expansion and presence of other commercial banks in Kenya. These results are 
consistent with the stylized facts that we discussed above, and they highlight the importance of 
institutions, such as Equity Bank,  with a business model focused on the provision of financial 
services to population segments ignored by traditional commercial banks while generating 
sustainable profits in the process. Such institutions can be an important solution to the financial 
access problem that has hindered the development of inclusive financial sectors in many developing 
countries.
VI. Conclusions 
The available evidence provides a convincing linkage between financial development and 
economic development.  Yet the level of financial development remains very low in Africa based 
28 Although Kenya is currently divided into 46 districts, the data set exploits a more disaggregated country division as of 
the 1999 census. In the 1999 census, Kenya comprised eight provinces (Central Coast, Eastern, Nairobi, North Eastern, 
Nyanza, Rift Valley, and Western) that were subdivided into 69 districts. Of these 69 districts, the survey data consider 
covers 65. 
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on the standard indicators of banking and capital market development.  Benchmarking based on the 
correlates of financial development in other developing countries reveals a substantial gap between 
predicted and actual levels of African financial development.  In addition, both country-level and 
firm-level tests indicate that the determinants of banking development in Africa differ from the rest 
of the world in telling ways.  
For example, inflation and the current account balance explain no variation in African 
financial development although they do so in other developing countries, and measures of 
institutional development explain less variation in Africa than elsewhere.  Why this collection of 
macroeconomic fundamentals is not strongly linked to African financial development remains 
unclear.  However, if these macroeconomic and institutional mechanisms could be made to 
function, our results suggest that the levels of financial development would rise. 
Most importantly, population density appears to be more important in Africa than elsewhere, 
and our firm-level study on the access to external financing indicates that population density is 
linked more to bank branch penetration in Africa than in the rest of the developing economies.  We 
also find a nonlinear relationship between population density and banking sector development, with 
the largest gap between Africa and other developing countries observed for those African countries 
‘trapped’ in the low density area.  Presumably, bank branch penetration figures remain low in 
Africa because of difficulties in achieving minimum viable scale in sparsely populated, low-income 
areas.  Therefore, technological advances, such as mobile banking, that enable users of financial 
services to be located far away from their financial institutions, provide a promising way to 
facilitate African financial development outside major cities, a topic that has been studied in the 
context of Kenya, where the mobile payments services of M-PESA are now widely used (Mbiti and 
Weill, 2010; Jack and Suri, 2010).  
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 While use of mobile payments services has increased rapidly in Kenya, those services have 
not proven to be effective vehicles for savings accumulation nor provision of credit (Mbiti and 
Weill, 2010). We present the stylized facts showing the effects of the expansion of bank branch 
networks in Kenya from 2006 to 2009 and, in particular, that of Equity Bank. While banks of all 
ownership types (private, foreign, and government) expanded their networks during this period, 
Equity’s expansion was most pronounced and its association with take-up of bank accounts and 
loans greater than for other banks. Equity Bank was also more likely to enter previously under-
served districts and the association between Equity’s presence and increased usage of bank accounts 
was larger for Kenyans with less wealth and education, that did not own a permanent home, and that 
lacked a salaried job.
 The more detailed analysis of the role of Equity Bank is a subject of an ongoing work by 
Allen et al (2011), and the current findings support the observations that we make in this paper. 
Overall, Equity Bank’s expansion experience suggests that it is possible to serve poorer segments of 
the African population while generating sustainable profits. At the same time, we recognize that the 
last chapter on this topic is yet to be written and that the current configuration of banking services 
provision in Kenya presents its own challenges. For example, a single bank now maintains 55% of 
the deposit accounts in the banking system and, and those deposits are covered by a deposit 
insurance fund, which could have implications for systemic stability. While we recognize that our 
contribution is closer to the first than the last word on the determinants of financial development 
and inclusion in Africa, our hope is that by combining country-, firm-, and household-level 
analyses, we have been able to shed some light on the contours of the current financial development 
gap and financial access issue in Africa.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics on the Country Sample 





Liquid liabilities / GDP 64.2% 47.4% 27.5% 17.7% 
Private credit / GDP 57.7% 45.3% 17.6% 22.7% 
Stock Market Capitalization / GDP 52.1% 60.0% 25.6% 43.8% 
Stock Market Value Traded / GDP 34.1% 50.9% 6.5% 20.0% 
Ln(Population) 2.44 1.59 2.24 1.33 
Ln(Population density) 0.44 1.94 0.09 0.12 
Natural resources 0.5 2.41 0.15 0.77 
Offshore center 4.4% 20.7% 0.0% 0.0% 
Ln(Per capita income) 2.25 1.04 0.38 0.94 
Population * GDP per capita 0.48 1.35 0.03 0.07 
Real GDP growth rate 4.1% 2.5% 4.8% 2.7% 
Inflation rate 5.2% 5.2% 9.3% 15.0% 
Current Account balance / GDP 0.2% 8.1% -3.8% 6.7% 
KKM index 0.33 0.9 -0.54 0.58 
Bank concentration 0.65 0.19 0.81 0.14 
Foreign ownership share 27.1% 25.9% 44.4% 24.4% 
State ownership share 15.9% 19.7% 13.3% 16.6% 
Manufacturing / GDP 16.8% 6.1% 11.0% 7.3% 
Secondary/Primary school enrollment 0.81 0.24 0.33 0.18 
Roads / Area 1.07 1.65 0.21 0.22 
Railroads / Area 0.03 0.03 0 0 
Urban population 63.6% 20.7% 36.2% 17.2% 
Geographic branch penetration 29.76 80.07 7.97 22.49 
Demographic branch penetration 16.51 17.28 2.86 3.64 
Data sources: For liquid liabilities/GDP, private credit/GDP, stock market capitalization/GDP, stock market 
value traded/GDP, and bank concentration: World Bank Database on Financial Development and Structure. 
See Thorsten Beck and Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, "Financial Institutions and Markets Across Countries and 
over Time: Data and Analysis"", World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4943, May 2009.  
Natural resources is the Lederman and Maloney (2008) measure of net exports in resource intensive 
industries as described in the text. Offshore center is a dummy variable defined by IMF (2007), “Financial 
Soundness Indicators: Experience with the Coordinated Compilation Exercise and Next Steps”, STA Dept. 
The KKM index is the measure of broad institutional development created by Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Maztruzzi (2007). Foreign and state ownership share of banking sector assets are from the World Bank 
Database of Bank Regulation and Supervision (2008). Geographic and demographic branch penetration are 
from CGAP, “Financial Access 2009: Measuring Access to Financial Services in 135 Countries.” All other 
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otes: (* p < 0.05). 
Table 3: Regressions on Banking Sector Development for the sample of non-African countries 
This table presents OLS regressions of banking sector development, measured by liquid liabilities/GDP and credit to 
the private sector extended by deposit money banks/GDP ratios, on a set of country-level variables including 
endowment (population and resources), macroeconomics, institutions, banking structure and other variables. We 
present models for all non-African countries and for (non-African) low and middle income countries separately. 
Standard errors are presented in the brackets below coefficients. 
 Liquid liabilities / GDP  Private credit / GDP 
 All  Low + Middle income  All  Low + Middle income 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Ln(Population) -0.017 -0.003  -0.001 -0.035  0.003 0.015  0.002 -0.027 
 (0.021) (0.028)  (0.019) (0.030)  (0.018) (0.021)  (0.017) (0.026) 
Ln(Population Density) 0.074*** 0.031  0.036 0.032  0.018 0.019  0.032* -0.020 
 (0.023) (0.027)  (0.022) (0.022)  (0.019) (0.020)  (0.019) (0.019) 
Natural Resources -0.038*** -0.069***  -0.034 -0.062*  -0.022* 0.0002  -0.010 -0.026 
 (0.014) (0.019)  (0.033) (0.036)  (0.012) (0.014)  (0.028) (0.031) 
Offshore Center 0.247* 0.133  0.369*** 0.341***  0.191 0.159  0.374*** 0.339*** 
 (0.145) (0.170)  (0.112) (0.121)  (0.123) (0.127)  (0.096) (0.102) 
Ln(Per Capita Income) 0.222*** 0.061  0.056 -0.091  0.275*** -0.016  0.089** -0.063 
 (0.036) (0.083)  (0.039) (0.065)  (0.031) (0.062)  (0.034) (0.055) 
Population * GDP Per Capita 0.004 -0.013  0.006 0.061  0.071** 0.062**  -0.031 0.015 
 (0.032) (0.033)  (0.100) (0.101)  (0.027) (0.024)  (0.086) (0.084) 
Real GDP Growth Rate  -2.015   -2.619**   -3.129***   -1.769** 
  (1.514)   (1.159)   (1.126)   (0.974) 
Inflation Rate  -1.219   -0.946*   -1.092**   -0.894** 
  (0.751)   (0.505)   (0.559)   (0.424) 
Current Account Balance / GDP  1.519***   1.565**   0.392   1.236** 
  (0.556)   (0.658)   (0.414)   (0.553) 
KKM Index  0.239***   0.215***   0.362***   0.210*** 
  (0.093)   (0.080)   (0.069)   (0.067) 
Manufacturing / GDP  -1.313**   0.436   -0.127   0.651 
  (0.652)   (0.580)   (0.485)   (0.487) 
Secondary/Primary Enrollment  -0.335   -0.040   -0.130   -0.004 
  (0.241)   (0.179)   (0.179)   (0.150) 
Constant 0.383*** 1.188***  0.467*** 0.990***  -0.041 0.782***  0.248*** 0.640*** 
 (0.123) (0.223)  (0.101) (0.167)  (0.104) (0.166)  (0.087) (0.141) 
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.51  0.14 0.36  0.54 0.70  0.22 0.43 
Observations/Countries 111 97  75 67  111 97  75 67 
       Notes: (* p< 0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
Table 4: Regressions on Banking Development for the sample of African countries
This table presents OLS regressions of banking sector development, measured by liquid liabilities/GDP and credit to 
the private sector from deposit money banks/GDP ratios, on a set of country-level variables including endowment 
(population and resources), macroeconomics, institutions, banking structure and other variables. We present models 
for all the sub-Saharan African countries, with and without South Africa.  Standard errors are presented in the 
brackets below coefficients. 
 Liquid liabilities / GDP  Private credit / GDP 
 All  Without South Africa  All  Without South Africa 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Ln(Population) -0.035 -0.004  -0.029 -0.011  -0.058** -0.021  -0.007 0.013 
 (0.026) (0.026)  (0.031) (0.030)  (0.024) (0.023)  (0.022) (0.021) 
Ln(Population Density) 0.074*** 0.080***  0.075*** 0.077***  0.0314* 0.049**  0.043*** 0.061*** 
 (0.019) (0.022)  (0.020) (0.024)  (0.018) (0.020)  (0.014) (0.016) 
Natural Resources -0.033 -0.013  -0.032 -0.010  -0.030 -0.001  -0.024 -0.015 
 (0.036) (0.047)  (0.037) (0.049)  (0.033) (0.041)  (0.027) (0.034) 
Offshore Center - -  - -  - -  - - 
            
Ln(Per Capita Income) 0.038 0.022  0.043 0.018  0.009 0.054  0.048* 0.073 
 (0.035) (0.078)  (0.037) (0.080)  (0.032) (0.068)  (0.027) (0.056) 
Population * GDP Per Capita 0.441 -0.281  0.057 0.221  2.941*** 2.396***  -0.141 -0.163 
 (0.520) (0.508)  (1.12) (1.197)  (0.477) (0.442)  (0.816) (0.834) 
Real GDP Growth Rate  -0.447   -0.499   -0.607   -0.343 
  (1.031)   (1.057)   (0.898)   (0.736) 
Inflation Rate  0.060   0.058   -0.076   -0.066 
  (0.192)   (0.196)   (0.167)   (0.136) 
Current Account Balance / GDP  -0.082   -0.207   -0.879*   -0.241 
  (0.587)   (0.656)   (0.511)   (0.457) 
KKM Index  0.116*   0.119*   0.073   0.058 
  (0.062)   (0.063)   (0.054)   (0.044) 
Manufacturing / GDP  -0.376   -0.341   -0.085   -0.265 
  (0.455)   (0.470)   (0.396)   (0.327) 
Secondary/Primary Enrollment  0.372   0.379   0.179   0.144 
  (0.247)   (0.252)   (0.215)   (0.175) 
Constant 0.548*** 0.528***  0.545*** 0.518***  0.297*** 0.260*  0.275*** 0.309*** 
 (0.078) (0.2613)  (0.079) (0.3044)  (0.071) (0.130)  (0.058) (0.243) 
Adjusted R2 0.36 0.53  0.34 0.52  0.64 0.78  0.24 0.45 
Observations/Countries 38 33  37 32  38 33  37 32 
Notes: (* p< 0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
Table 5: Regressions for the combined sample of low and middle income and African countries 
This table presents OLS regressions of banking sector development, measured by liquid liabilities/GDP and credit to the 
private sector from deposit money banks/GDP ratios, on a set of country-level variables including endowment (population 
and resources), macroeconomics, institutions, banking structure and other variables. We include all the low and middle 
income countries (including Africa, excluding South Africa), an African dummy variable, and interactions between each of 
our explanatory variables and the Africa dummy. Standard errors are presented in the brackets below coefficients, and F-
statistics are shown at the bottom of the table. 
 Liquid Liabilities/GDP Private Credit/GDP 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Africa -0.105* 0.078 -0.472*  -0.066 0.027 -0.331 
 (0.054) (0.147) (0.280)  (0.045) (0.124) (0.231) 
Ln(Population) -0.009 -0.001 -0.035  0.0005 0.002 -0.027 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.028)  (0.013) (0.015) (0.023) 
Ln(Population Density) 0.050*** 0.036* 0.032  0.036*** 0.032* 0.020 
(0.016) (0.019) (0.020)  (0.013) (0.016) (0.017) 
Natural Resources -0.031 -0.034 -0.062*  -0.012 -0.010 -0.026 
(0.025) (0.030) (0.033)  (0.021) (0.025) (0.027) 
Offshore Center 0.363*** 0.369*** 0.341***  0.378*** 0.374*** 0.339*** 
(0.098) (0.101) (0.110)  (0.082) (0.085) (0.091) 
Ln(Per Capita Income) 0.052** 0.056 -0.091  0.070*** 0.089*** -0.063 
(0.026) (0.035) (0.059)  (0.022) (0.030) (0.049) 
Population * GDP Per Capita 0.030 0.006 0.061  -0.023 -0.031 0.015 
(0.084) (0.089) (0.091)  (0.071) (0.075) (0.075) 
Real GDP Growth Rate   -2.619**    -1.769** 
  (1.053)    (0.869) 
Inflation Rate   -0.946**    -0.894** 
  (0.458)    (0.378) 
Current Account Balance / GDP   1.565**    1.236** 
  (0.598)    (0.493) 
KKM Index   0.215***    0.210*** 
  (0.072)    (0.060) 
Manufacturing / GDP   0.436    0.651 
  (0.526)    (0.434) 
Secondary/Primary Enrollment   -0.040    -0.004 
   (0.163)    (0.134) 
Interactions with Africa dummy        
    Ln(Population)  -0.027 0.024   -0.010 0.041 
  (0.048) (0.054)   (0.040) (0.044) 
    Ln(Population Density)  0.039 0.046   0.010 0.041 
  (0.035) (0.041)   (0.029) (0.034) 
    Natural Resources  0.001 0.052   -0.014 0.010 
  (0.061) (0.081)   (0.051) (0.067) 
    Ln(Per Capita Income)  -0.013 0.109   -0.042 0.136 
  (0.065) (0.136)   (0.054) (0.112) 
    Population * GDP Per Capita  0.051 0.160   -0.110 -0.178 
  (1.634) (1.833)   (1.373) (1.513) 
    Real GDP Growth Rate   2.120    1.425 
   (1.930)    (1.592) 
    Inflation Rate   1.004*    0.830* 
   (0.547)    (0.452) 
    Current Account Balance / GDP   -1.773    -1.477 
   (1.168)    (0.963) 
    KKM Index   -0.096    -0.152 
   (0.121)    (0.100) 
    Manufacturing / GDP   -0.776    -0.916 
   (0.891)    (0.735) 
    Secondary/Primary Enrollment   0.418    0.148 
   (0.418)    (0.345) 
Constant 0.525*** 0.467*** 0.990**  0.294*** 0.248*** 0.640*** 
 (0.073) (0.091) (0.152)  (0.061) (0.076) (0.125) 
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.31 0.45  0.37 0.34 0.51 
Observations 112 112 99  112 112 99 
F(Population Density = 0 for Africa) 6.74 4.62 3.07 4.27 
    Corresponding p-value 0.011 0.035 0.083 0.042 
F(GDP Growth = 0 for Africa)  0.10  0.07 
    Corresponding p-value  0.758  0.798 
F(Inflation Rate = 0 for Africa)  0.04  0.07 
    Corresponding p-value  0.848  0.797 
F(KKM Index= 0 for Africa)  1.50  0.52 
    Corresponding p-value  0.224  0.473 
F(CA Balance / GDP = 0 for Africa)  0.04  0.09 
    Corresponding p-value  0.837  0.771 
F(Natural Resources = 0 for Africa)  0.02  0.06 
    Corresponding p-value  0.893  0.802 
 Notes: (* p< 0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
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hite’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. W
e use the sam
e m
odel specifications as those in Table 7, C
olum
ns 3 and 7.  F-statistics 
are presented in square brackets. * p< 0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. A
rea is defined in term
s of square m
iles. G
eographic branch penetration is the num
ber of com
m
ercial bank branches per 
sq. km





ographic branch penetration is com
m
ercial bank branches per 100,000 residents. In unreported specifications, w
e also included %
 of population in 
urban agglom
erates, railroad track distance per sq. km
, %
 arable land, and a m
easure of the geographic concentration of population w
ith 0 indicating a uniform
 distribution and 1 indicating 
that the entire population is concentrated in a 20km
x20km
 cell (as used in C
ollier and H
oeffler, 2004). Inclusion of those variables substantially reduced sam
ple size, and none produced 
consistently significant results for both indicators of financial developm
ent, and w
hen population density w
as excluded from
 the specification.
Table 7: Summary Statistics: Firm Sample based on ICS Surveys 
This table presents summary statistics on our firm-level sample (used in regressions in Table 11), 
based on World Banks’ Investment Climate Surveys over the past decade. The surveys were 
conducted over the period 2002-2006, with the majority of the firms surveyed once. Firm 
characteristics (all dummy variables) include size (small, medium, and large based on the number of 
employees), industry (manufacturing, services, and others), exporter status and foreign ownership 
status. The external finance dummy equals one if a firm has access to loans from domestic or foreign 
banks, or credit card debts from these institutions, and zero otherwise; we only include firm 
observations for which data is available on whether the firm has access to all three external financing 
channels.
Panel A African countries (excluding South Africa) 
N Mean Std. Dev. Fraction of 0 
Firm Size-Small (0 or 1) 2,591 0.46 0.50 -- 
Firm Size-Medium (0 or 1) 2,591 0.30 0.46 -- 
Foreign (0 or 1) 2,591 0.25 0.43 -- 
Exporter (0 or 1) 2,591 0.18 0.38 -- 
Manufacturing (0 or 1) 2,591 0.70 0.46 -- 
Services (0 or 1) 2,591 0.17 0.37 -- 
Access to External Finance (0 or 1) 2,591 0.16 0.37 83.91% 
      
Panel B  Other Low- and Middle-income Countries (excluding Africa) 
Firm Size-Small (0 or 1) 30,525 0.34 0.47 -- 
Firm Size-Medium (0 or 1) 30,525 0.33 0.47 -- 
Foreign (0 or 1) 30,525 0.13 0.33 -- 
Exporter (0 or 1) 30,525 0.24 0.43 -- 
Manufacturing (0 or 1) 30,525 0.66 0.47 -- 
Services (0 or 1) 30,525 0.27 0.44 -- 
Access to External Finance (0 or 1) 30,525 0.26 0.44 73.75% 
Table 8 Regressions for the sample of low and middle income and African countries: 
Firm-level Results 
This table presents marginal effects from Probit regressions with the dependent variable equal 1 if a firm 
has access to loans from domestic or foreign banks, or credit card debts from these institutions, and 
zero otherwise. The surveys were conducted over the period 2002-2006, with the majority of the firms 
surveyed once. The explanatory variables include firm characteristics and a subset of country-level 
variables used in Table 7. We include firms from all the low and middle income countries (including 
Africa, excluding South Africa), an African dummy variable, and interactions between each of our 
explanatory variables and the Africa dummy. White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are 
clustered at the country-level, and presented in the brackets below coefficients. F-statistics are shown at 
the bottom of the table.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Africa Dummy 0.011 0.449** 0.230 -0.061 0.093 
[0.104] [0.189] [0.169] [0.111] [0.147] 
Small -0.151*** -0.144*** -0.140*** -0.142*** -0.142*** 
[0.023] [0.015] [0.018] [0.026] [0.024] 
Medium -0.066*** -0.062*** -0.059*** -0.058*** -0.058*** 
[0.011] [0.012] [0.011] [0.012] [0.012] 
Foreign -0.046*** -0.042*** -0.048*** -0.046*** -0.046*** 
[0.013] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] 
Exporter 0.053*** 0.037*** 0.059*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.011] 
Manufacturing 0.082*** 0.048** 0.068*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 
[0.030] [0.024] [0.025] [0.030] [0.029] 
Services -0.029 -0.033 -0.038 -0.035 -0.035 
[0.023] [0.024] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] 
KKM index 0.067* 0.032 0.092* 0.055 0.056 
[0.035] [0.028] [0.048] [0.037] [0.037] 
Ln(Per Capita Income) -0.007 -0.029 0.006 -0.001 -0.000 
[0.032] [0.032] [0.033] [0.032] [0.035] 
Natural Resources 0.015 0.019 0.001 0.018 0.018 
[0.023] [0.018] [0.029] [0.022] [0.022] 
Age of the firm -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Ln(Population Density) 0.054*** 0.021 0.045** 0.060** 0.059*** 
[0.019] [0.026] [0.018] [0.026] [0.020] 
Roads/Area 0.060* 
[0.034] 
Foreign Ownership Share -0.197* 
[0.119] 
Number branches per 1000km2 -0.004 
[0.034] 
Number branches per 100k adults -0.000 
[0.001] 
Small*Africa 0.020 -0.014 0.008 -0.047 -0.022 
[0.042] [0.037] [0.045] [0.037] [0.041] 
Medium*Africa 0.069 0.022 0.065 -0.028 0.000 
[0.043] [0.040] [0.043] [0.029] [0.033] 
Foreign*Africa 0.013 0.017 0.049 0.005 0.000 
[0.032] [0.035] [0.035] [0.041] [0.040] 
Exporter*Africa 0.019 0.034 0.002 -0.037 -0.012 
[0.031] [0.029] [0.031] [0.033] [0.028] 
Manufacturing*Africa -0.110*** -0.076* -0.118*** -0.097** -0.103** 
[0.034] [0.041] [0.033] [0.045] [0.042] 
Services*Africa -0.184*** -0.148*** -0.179*** -0.157*** -0.180*** 
[0.021] [0.032] [0.032] [0.033] [0.027] 
KKM index*Africa 0.035 0.108 0.072 -0.003 0.014 
[0.079] [0.080] [0.085] [0.089] [0.090] 
Ln(Per Capita Income)*Africa -0.045 -0.002 -0.049 -0.043 0.012 
[0.059] [0.073] [0.060] [0.084] [0.074] 
Natural Resources*Africa -0.035 -0.451 0.279 1.439*** 0.725 
[0.484] [0.453] [0.614] [0.476] [0.909] 
Age of the firm*Africa 0.002*** 0.001 0.002** 0.002** 0.002*** 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Ln(Population Density)*Africa -0.000 0.086* -0.014 -0.018 0.030 
[0.031] [0.051] [0.027] [0.045] [0.039] 
Roads/Area*Africa -0.483** 
[0.222] 
Foreign Ownership Share*Africa -0.260 
[0.170] 
Num branches per 1000km2*Africa 0.340*** 
[0.100] 
Num branches per 100K adults*Africa 0.004 
[0.013] 
Observations 35,912 30,054 34,622 32,276 32,276 
Adjusted R square 0.0874 0.0785 0.0904 0.0921 0.0910 
test ln_pd+ln_pd*africa chi2 4.574 5.909 2.396 1.285 7.006 
p-value ln_pd 0.0325 0.0151 0.122 0.257 0.00812 
test roads_area + roads_area_africa = 0 chi2 3.741 
p-value roads 0.0531 
test fos + fos_africa = 0 chi2 13.51 
p-value fos 0.000237 
test geobrpen + geobrpen_africa = 0 chi2 13.54 
p-value geobrpen 0.000233 
test demobrpen + demobrpen_africa = 0 chi2 0.0866 
pvalue demobrpen 0.769 
Table 9 Number of Bank Branches by type of District 
This table reports the number of bank branches by type of district: Urban, Rural and Arid and 
Semi-Arid. This table was constructed based on alternative sources, including phone calls, 
official websites, banks’ annual reports and government publications. 
Table 10 Bank Branches over Time: Commercial Banks in Kenya 
This table reports the number of Kenyan bank branches by bank name and ownership in 2006 and 
2009. The table considers only banks with 20 or more bank branches by 2009. This table was 
constructed based on alternative sources, including phone calls, official websites, banks’ annual 
reports and government publications. 
District 2006 2009 Change % Change
Urban 290 471 181 62
Rural 238 398 160 67
Arid and Semi-Arid 42 89 47 112
Total 570 958 388 68
Local private banks 2006 2009 Change % Change
Equity Bank 44 112 68 155
Co-operative Bank of Kenya Ltd. 52 83 31 60
Diamond Trust Bank of Kenya Ltd. 8 32 24 300
Commercial Bank of Africa Ltd. 19 20 1 5
All local private banks 247 450 203 82
Foreign banks
Barclays Bank of Kenya Ltd. 62 119 57 92
Standard Chartered Bank  Kenya Ltd. 31 35 4 13
K-Rep Bank Ltd. 22 30 8 36
All foreign banks 150 258 108 72
Government and government-influenced banks
Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd. 117 169 52 44
National Bank of Kenya Ltd. 33 43 10 30
CFC Stanbic Bank Ltd. 16 35 19 119
All gov. and gov.-influenced banks 179 262 83 46
Table 11 Market Participation Major Commercial Banks in Kenya 
This table reports market shares of gross assets, total deposits, total capital, number of deposit 
accounts and number of loan accounts as at 31st January, 2011. This table was constructed based 
on alternative sources, including official websites, banks’ annual reports and government 
publications. 
 
Table 12  Use of Bank Services in Kenya 
This table reports the percentage of people having a bank account and a loan from a bank in 
Kenya. It also reports the presence of Equity across districts. This table was constructed based on 
FinAccess 2006 and 2009 surveys and alternative sources, including phone calls, official 











 Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd 13.5% 13.2% 15.4% 10.93% 19.8%
 Barclays Bank of Kenya Ltd 10.4% 9.9% 12.2% 6.77% 14.1%
Co-operative Bank 9.0% 9.8% 7.5% 12.26% 12.0%
 Standard Chartered Bank Ltd 8.2% 8.3% 7.6% 0.92% 1.5%
 Equity Bank Ltd. 8.0% 7.8% 10.7% 47.39% 33.8%
 CfC Stanbic Bank Ltd 5.9% 6.2% 3.8% 0.47% 1.8%
Variable 2006 2009
Bank account 14.20% 22.70%
Bank Loan 2.90% 4.40%
Equity Bank presence 48% 87%
Figure 1: Liquid liabilities / GDP in African countries, actual vs. predicted values
(Notes: Based on the specification in Table 3, Column 4; negative predicted values are replaced by zero). 
Figure 2: Private credit / GDP in African countries, actual vs. predicted values
(Notes: Based on the specification in Table 3, Column 8; negative predicted values are replaced by zero.) 
Figure 3: Relationship between population density and liquid liabilities/GDP
Notes: Plots are for the typical African and non-African developing country based on Table 5.  
Specifically, the vertical axis plots predicted values from Model 2 in Table 5.  For all variables other than 
population density, we use the mean value for the subsample (either Africa or other developing countries) 
multiplied by the appropriate coefficient for that subsample.  For population density, we run through the 
range of possible values and multiply by the appropriate coefficient for each subsample to generate the 
curvature.
Figure 4 Relationship between population density and private credit/GDP
Notes: The vertical axis plots predicted values from Model 5 in Table 5.  For all variables other than 
population density, we use the mean value for the subsample (either Africa or other developing countries) 
multiplied by the appropriate coefficient for that subsample.  For population density, we run through the 
range of possible values and multiply by the appropriate coefficient for each subsample to generate the 
curvature.
Figure 5. Demographic bank penetration and GDP per capita. This figure shows the 
relationship between GDP per capita and the number of bank branches per 100,000 people across 
low income economies in 2003/2004. The sample considers countries with a GDP per capita 
below 4,000USD. The grey dots correspond to Sub-Saharan African countries. The black dots 
correspond to the rest of the countries. The data source is Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Martinez 
Peria (2007). 
Figure 6. Stock market performance. This figure shows the stock market performance of 
Kenya Commercial Bank (KNCB), Equity Bank (EQBNK) and Barclays Bank of Kenya (BCBL) 
since August 18th, 2006. The data source is interactive chart from Bloomberg 
(http://www.bloomberg.com). 
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Figure 8. Equity Bank’s performance indicators. This figure shows the evolution of the number of 
customers, deposits, gross loan portfolio, total assets, profits before taxes, and shareholders’ funds over the 
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